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  Over the past three and a half decades, China has seen a surge in the ratio of male to 
female newborns. A biologically normal sex ratio at birth calls for around 105 or 106 boys for 
every 100 girls (Sen, 1990), and before 1985, Chinese parents gave birth to about 107 newborn 
boys for every 100 girls, a figure that falls within the normal range for sex ratio at birth. In the 
years following the enactment of the One Child Policy, which dictated that most Chinese couples 
only have one child or face steep fines and other legal penalties, this number has climbed 
dramatically. Between 2005 and 2010, China’s sex ratio at birth averaged 117 boys for every 100 
girls born– an alarmingly high figure. Economic incentives and cultural preferences favoring 
boys, coupled with the constraints on childbearing opportunities imposed by the One Child Policy 
have resulted in a startling reduction in the number of women in China today. 
 While the One Child Policy has had an undeniable negative impact on China’s deficit of 
female babies, the significant reduction in the number of girls born in China since 1980 also owes 
a great deal to the widespread adoption of ultrasound technology in China, which has given 
prospective parents the tools necessary for determining the sex of an unborn child. Sex-selective 
abortion accounts for an overwhelming majority of China’s excess males (Wei, Li, Hesketh, Liu, 
and Zhang, 2005), and increased access to the requisite technology has significantly widened the 
gap in the number of newborn boys and girls (Chen, Li, and Meng 2013).  
 Although the One Child Policy sounds as though it constitutes a highly rigid legal 
framework with regard to fertility, it is a much less dictatorial policy than its name suggests. In an 
effort to reduce high male birthrates and to appease groups who are especially resistant to 
fertility policy, China’s national government, as well as provincial and municipal authorities, has 
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instituted a number of exceptions to the One Child Policy, allowing certain parents to have 
additional children, though these efforts have met with little success. These exceptions most 
frequently apply to poor, rural families, who exhibit high rates of son preference relative to the 
rest of China’s population. Often, rural families are allowed to have a second child provided that 
they have already had a daughter. Furthermore, financial disincentives for additional fertility 
create an environment where well-off families are more likely to be able to afford additional 
children. Since selecting for the sex of an unborn child may require bribery or expensive 
procedures such as sperm-sorting, wealthy families are better situated to engage in sex-selection. 
Thus, second children in China are even more disproportionately male than their older siblings, 
with 62% of births following a daughter being male in 2000 (Ebenstein, 2010: 92).  
 This paper examines the determinants of China’s increasingly unbalanced sex ratio at 
birth with a special focus on maternal educational attainment. First, I provide a brief summary of 
the One Child Policy, focusing on some particulars of its implementation and justification. I then 
give a brief survey of economic and demographic literature relating to the effects and 
determinants of sex-selective behavior in developing countries, especially in China. A theoretical 
discussion of education and son preference follows, including an outline of a model of the effect of 
education on sex-selective behavior in India and a model of fertility decision making in the 
context of the One Child Policy. Since India and China are similar in both their levels of 
development and degrees of son preference, the first of these models offers useful perspective on 
the mechanics of son preference in developing countries in general. The second of these models 
focuses more on the decisions of individuals in the context of the One Child Policy, though it does 
not detail the effects of education on these decisions.  
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This paper attempts to reconcile the conclusions of these two models through empirical 
analysis, demonstrating a positive correlation between maternal education and son preference in 
Chinese families following the institution of the One Child Policy. In spite of the restrictive policy 
environment fostered by the One Child Policy, women have a great deal of agency in decisions 
regarding their own fertility, and educational attainment is one of the primary determinants of 
how these decisions are made. This indicates that the One Child Policy effected a shift in the 
factors influencing Chinese parents with regard to sex-selection, as education has become a 
significant predictor of son preference in Chinese individuals who have had children since 1980. 
II. History of the One Child Policy 
 The Chinese Communist Party began its efforts to curb China’s unchecked population 
growth in the 1960s. After famine claimed nearly 30 million lives between 1959 and 1961, the 
fertility rate in China climbed to alarmingly high levels during the following decade. While the 
national government made no explicit restrictions on the number of children couples could have, 
it initiated a campaign to promote birth control in an effort to lower national fertility. This ended 
with the dawn of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, and the government ceased to manage fertility 
rates until 1970. 
 Chinese fertility policy in the 1970s took a similar tack to the short-lived attempts of the 
1960s, though in a more coordinated fashion. Instead of dictating how many children couples 
could have, the government strongly encouraged parents to have no more than two children. In 
fact, reductions in China’s national fertility rate were more substantial in the 1970s than in any 
other decade, as the total fertility rate (TFR) fell from 5.8 to 2.2 (Liang, Lee: 2006: 14). Increased 
female participation in the labor force, and a number of acute shortages of food and other 
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essentials had undeniably significant impacts on the fertility rate during this period. Nonetheless, 
as the 1980s began, China’s government took an even stronger stance against population growth. 
 The One Child Policy may be the most ambitious example of demographic engineering in 
human history. Its official implementation in January of 19811 marks yet another turning point in 
the composition and growth of China’s population. Much of the theoretic justification for these 
measures stems from the resurgence of Malthusianism in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. Works 
such as Limits to Growth (Meadows et al.: 1972) offered numeric justifications for their dire 
predictions about the consequences of unchecked population growth in the developing world 
(Hartmann: 1995). As China turned its sights toward Zhou Enlai’s “Four Modernizations”2 in the 
late 1970’s (at that point under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping), China’s high rate of population 
growth loomed as a major obstacle to its economic prosperity. 
 Justifications for the One Child Policy applied this “Malthusian orthodoxy” of early 1970’s 
control theory and applied it in broad, sweeping strokes. While politicians touted a number of 
numeric projections used to illustrate the severity of China’s population problems as unassailably 
correct, reliable demographic statistics were simply unavailable in China at that time 
(Greenhalgh, 2003). In the absence of alternate research or projections, the One Child Policy 
appeared to be the only way to avert certain disaster. 
 Regardless of the reasoning behind it, the One Child Policy has brought about further 
reductions in the rate of population growth in China. Incidentally, its implementation coincides 
with one of the most remarkable periods of economic growth in any country in recorded history. 
The natural growth rate of China’s population has fallen considerably in the period since 1980, 
                                                        
1 The first official documents authorizing the state to dictate fertility policy date to January 4, 1981, when they were 
drafted by China’s State Planning Commission (Vogel, 2011). However, the policy was first proposed in 1979 (Lee, Chang: 
2006). 
2 That is, agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. 
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averaging a 2.7% annual reduction, while GDP growth has averaged 9.94% (UNData) in each year 
over the same period. 
While the One Child Policy may have had a substantial effect in the form of reductions in 
the rate of population growth in China, it has also carried with it a number of much more 
insidious demographic side effects.  The rate of population growth in China has slowed a great 
deal since the introduction of the One Child Policy, but the ratio of boys to girls born over that 
same period has increased consistently and dramatically. The sex ratio at birth in China begins to 
climb from a relatively normal level of 107 boys for every 100 girls born between 1980 and 1985 
to a truly concerning level of 117 boys for every 100 girls born between 2005 and 2010 
(UNData). By the year 2000, around 9 million baby girls were “missing” due to abnormally high 
rates of male births in the years since 1980 (Ebenstein, 2010). This trend continued into the new 
millennium unabated, as China’s sex ratio at birth has hovered around 120 boys for every 100 
girls for the past decade and a half.  
The necessity of the One Child Policy has also come under greater scrutiny in recent years. 
Rapid economic growth in China since 1978 has also had an undeniable effect on birth rates, as 
rising national income and higher rates of female participation in the labor force have increased 
the opportunity cost of having a child for many parents. In fact, many countries that have 
followed a similar developmental path to that of China have experienced similar reductions in the 
rate of fertility in the years since 1980 (Wang, Cai: 2010).  
 While its name might indicate rigid uniformity in the fertility of Chinese families, the One 
Child Policy admits a number of exceptions. For instance, couples who give birth to disabled 
children or whose first child dies in infancy are often allowed to have a second child. Moreover, 
families who live in especially poor, rural areas or who are engaged in labor-intensive 
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occupations (such as certain forms of agriculture) are often allowed to have additional children 
as well. An exhaustive list of exceptions to the One Child Policy can be found in Gu et al. (2007). 
 The most widely invoked exception to the One Child Policy allows families with one 
daughter to have a second child. This amendment to the Policy was introduced in many provinces 
during the mid-1980s in an effort to combat China’s rising sex ratio at birth and to quell rural 
resistance to the new policy. However, many parents who are subject to this exception have 
opted to engage in sex-selective behavior for their second child, resulting in an extremely high 
sex ratio at birth among second-born children in China (Ebenstein: 2010).   
 While the One Child Policy owes its inception to the national government, mechanisms of 
enforcement and exceptions vary considerably across polities and time. Implementation of the 
policy has been a largely decentralized affair. Mechanisms of enforcement range from forced 
sterilizations and abortions to financial penalties such as fines or wage cuts. During the 1990s, 
financial penalization became the primary means of dissuading parents from having further 
children, although reports of state-mandated abortion also continue to come out of China.  
 
III. Literature Review and Data 
 There is a small but substantial body of demographic and economic literature dedicated to 
examining the causes of China’s unbalanced sex ratio at birth. A number of cultural and economic 
forces shape fertility decisions in China, and their effects may be difficult to examine separately 
(Lipatov, 2008; Ebenstein 2011). Indeed, rates of sex-selection appear to be lower in areas where 
female income is relatively high (Qian, 2008). The One-Child policy has also resulted in higher 
rates of sex-selective abortion and lower survival rates for female infants (Arnold and Zhaoxiang, 
1986; Zhu, Lu, and Hesketh, 2009), especially among second- or third-born children (Johansson 
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and Nygren, 1991). In fact, the One-Child policy could account for more than half of China’s excess 
male births from 1991-2005 (Li, Yi, Zhang: 2011), though ultrasound technology has undoubtedly 
also played a large role in China’s rising sex ratio at birth.  Nonetheless, increasingly severe 
enforcement measures during the 1990’s may have caused parents to refrain from reporting 
female births (Hull, 1990), a fact that introduces a sample selection problem to regressions on 
more recent census data (Goodkind, 2011).  
 China’s high ratio of boys to girls has grave social implications and consequences. 
Countries with high numbers of males relative to females in their population as a whole may be 
more likely to experience high rates of violent and petty crime (Hudson and den Boer, 2004). 
Furthermore, the harsh, institutionalized nature of China’s family planning policy compounds 
many of the issues that give rise to son preference in Chinese society. Such rigid, top-down 
enforcement of the One-Child policy may foster an environment where males dictate fertility 
decisions, increasing female vulnerability within the household and society (Chen, 2008). In 
addition to economic disincentives, Chinese officials have often enforced the One-Child policy 
with outrageously coercive methods, as well as forced sterilizations and late-term abortions 
(Hartmann, 1995).  
  In other Asian countries such as India, a few studies address the link between education 
and sex ratio at birth. Additional years of maternal education appear to improve survival rates for 
female children in India (Bourne and Walker, 1991). However, while further years of education 
are correlated with lower degrees of son preference in individuals, which translates into lower 
rates of sex-selection in more educated areas, the higher levels of economic opportunity that 
accompany greater educational attainment make technology for sex-selection such as ultrasound 
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more readily available to prospective parents.3 This suggests that areas with higher numbers of 
educated people may, paradoxically, have higher sex ratios at birth (Echavarri and Ezcurra, 
2010). In fact, changes in female literacy do not necessarily presage improvements in the sex 
ratio at birth, and can even cause son preference to become more pronounced (Clark, 2000).   
 For the purposes of this paper, I have chosen to use individual-level data from the 2000 
National Household Survey from China. The 2000 National Household Survey includes the most 
complete set of individual level data currently available from China. Individual level census data 
are also available from 1982 and 1990, but responses do not include a number of essential 
variables, including those correlated with income.  Respondents in the 2000 census reported 
their highest level of educational attainment and whether or not they were literate, essential 
variables in my analysis. However, since these variables were self-reported, they may introduce 
some measurement error to any statistical analysis of the responses. Moreover, this census 
includes data on respondents’ cost of living, a suitable proxy for income, as well as information on 
whether respondents live in urban, suburban, or rural areas.  
 I have also consulted data from the China Statistical Yearbook series, published annually 
by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. The Statistical Yearbooks contain more general 
statistics, including population growth and sex composition at the national and provincial levels. 
Unfortunately, the yearbooks contain no information about the birth population, diminishing 
their usefulness for the purposes of this paper.  
 Finally, I have consulted annual reports on the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics 
websites curated by government agencies, and data from the World Bank and the United Nations 
in my efforts to find some of the figures for China’s sex ratio at birth since 1990. Given the 
                                                        
3 I follow Echavarri and Ezcurra by referring to this effect as “technological constraint change” hereafter. 
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sensitive nature of these statistics, I have had to gather these them from a variety of sources, 
since no authoritative set of figures was available. 
 
IV. Models of Sex-selection 
In order to form a working hypothesis about the effect of education on China’s sex ratio at 
birth, I will first delineate a set of theoretical frameworks in which to conceptualize the effect of 
education on fertility decisions. My analysis of the mechanics of fertility decision-making draws 
heavily on two models of sex preference. One (Echavarri and Ezcurra, 2010) attempts to explain 
the relationship between individual educational attainment, the reproduction of cultural beliefs 
and values across generations, and sex-selective behavior. The other (Ebenstein, 2010) presents 
the relationship between the legal framework of the One Child Policy, with its many local 
variants, and the series of information sets presented to prospective parents in China. 
 Echavarri and Ezcurra (2010) present a general model of the effect of education on sex-
selective behavior in India. While the demographic policy environments in India and China are 
not perfectly analogous, these two countries share a widespread cultural preference for sons, as 
well as economic factors that motivate biases in favor of male offspring. Since male earning 
power is relatively high in both China and India, parents may favor sons as a result of economic 
necessity or social security. This is especially true in China, where the state provides little social 
security, leaving children in charge of care for their aging parents. Echavarri and Ezcurra’s model 
is defined as follows. 
 Consider a population where (for the sake of simplicity) each generation is composed of n 
individuals. Of these n individuals,  exhibit son preference, where 0    1. Thus, some 
fraction of the population will, given access to the technology required for sex-selection, seek an 
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abortion should they discover that they have conceived a female child. In the absence of any 
external influence (education, for instance) children in one generation acquire their parents’ 
beliefs, and therefore, without such influence, individuals in one generation will display 
preferences identical to those of their parents in the previous generation. 
 Let , where 0    1, represent the share of the population with access to the 
technology required to determine the sex of an unborn child and subsequently to seek an 
abortion. In spite of the prevalence of sex-selection in China and India, some people may not be 
able to afford the tests and procedures that are required for sex-selection, and while the number 
of counties where ultrasound technology is readily available has risen steadily over the past 30 
years (Chen, Li, and Meng, 2013), government policy measures designed to combat sex-selection 
have increased the expense and difficulty associated with sex-selective abortion (Kristof, 1993). 
Furthermore, ultrasound was adopted in a piece-wise manner throughout China, with some 
provinces not gaining ultrasound-equipped facilities until the 1990s (Chen et al.: 2013). It 
therefore makes sense to assume imperfect access to ultrasound technology in China, as in India. 
 The model incorporates education in the form of an exogenous shock where the 
population is divided into a group of  individuals who are educated and  individuals who are 
not. Some portion  of the educated group, where 0    1, exhibits son preference (as 
defined above) and some portion  of the educated group has access to sex-selective technology. 
By merit of increased income and mobility associated with higher levels of education, we may 
assume that   , however, as we will soon see, the relationship between  and  is 
uncertain. 
 The  individuals who are unaffected by the aforementioned educational shock retain the 
characteristics of the population before the shock. That is,  of these individuals have access 
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to sex-selective technology (by merit of income and proximity), and  of these individuals 
exhibit son preference. 
 In order to fully conceptualize the effect of the educational shock on the realization of sex-
preference (through sex-selective abortion) within the population following the shock, we 
introduce one final parameter: k where 0    1. If  

 ! , then educated people are less 
likely to exhibit sex-preference than people who have not received an education, that is,  " . 
However, this does not preclude the possibility that a higher portion of educated people will 
realize their preferences through active, sex-selective behavior (abortion). It may be helpful to 
think of a fall in sex-selective behavior following the shock as implying that 

 ! . Conversely, 
if  

 " ,  then 
 $ , and sex-selective behavior will be more consistently realized within 
the educated segment of the population by   .  
 Thus, the effects of education on the prevalence of sex-selective behavior by parents are 
twofold. Education may cause preference change in individuals, which occurs if 

 ! , 
resulting in  " . However, education also causes technological constraint change, where 
individuals who have higher incomes as a result of their educational attainment are more likely 
to have access to the procedures necessary to select for the sex of their child. Furthermore, 
despite legislation in China and India preventing doctors from disclosing the sex of an unborn 
child, parents often circumvent this law through bribery, a much more feasible option for parents 
with higher levels of income. This is represented by the inequality   .   
 Within the context of my empirical analysis, this model has some obvious shortcomings. 
For one thing, it conceives of education as a binary variable, where an individual has either 
received an education or not. However, education can mean many different things depending on 
level of attainment in addition to concentration of educated individuals within a community, 
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which is the sole determinant of the likelihood of diminished son preference in Ezcurra and 
Echavarri’s model. Some levels of education may more profoundly effect technological constraint 
change while others may be more likely to instill values that challenge the cultural beliefs 
instilled on an individual by his or her family and culture. Indeed, my empirical analysis finds a 
significant variety of marginal effects on son preference across seven different levels of 
educational attainment. 
 The model presented above may have more bearing when considering the effect of literacy 
on son preference, and this may be the main point of divergence between India and China. China’s 
adult literacy rate exceeded 95% in 2010, while India’s stood just below 63% (CIA World 
Factbook). In China, a country with much more universal literacy, a binary conceptualization of 
education is much less useful. Other aspects of an individual’s education may have more 
profound effects on their attitudes towards long prevailing beliefs. 
   Ebenstein (2011) suggests a model of sex-selection under the One Child Policy using the 
framework of rational choice theory. One particularly common variation of the One Child Policy 
allows couples to have a second child provided that their first child is a girl. This results in an 
especially high sex ratio among second children in China, as couples with a preference for sons 
face a much greater incentive to engage in sex-selection when trying for a second child.  
 A couple living under this version of the One Child Policy faces up to three decisions 
within this framework. Assuming that they initially conceive a female child, they face a choice of 
engaging in sex-selection in order to have a male child yielding a payoff of %&  where %&  is the 
monetary value that household i associates with having a son or allowing the initial pregnancy to 
come to term, which yields a payoff of '& where '& is the monetary value that household i 
associates with having a daughter. However, selecting for a child’s sex requires a household to 
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incur a cost of (& , which represents the cumulative total cost of the process of conception and 
abortion until a male child is conceived. This cost is clearly subjective since different couples will 
need to make different numbers of attempts and may also enjoy differing degrees of proximity to 
sex-selective technology.  
 The model assumes that couples whose first child is a son do not have any additional 
children. This assumption is realistic given that the common exception the One Child Policy 
allows couples with one daughter to have a second child.  Thus, we can see that the final payoff to 
a couple that selects for a son at the first decision node is equal to %& ) (& . 
 At the second decision node, a couple faces the choice of whether or not to have a second 
child. Since reaching this node is conditional on the couple having had a daughter, choosing not to 
have a second child dictates that their final payoff will be equal to '&, the monetary value that they 
associate with having just one daughter. 
 At the third decision node, a couple once again chooses whether or not to engage in sex-
selection. We assume that the value to each household of having a second daughter is normalized 
to be zero and that the value that each household associates with having a son remains 
unchanged. Thus, the additional return to household i of a son after having a daughter and the 
return associated with having a second daughter are . 51+%& ) ,- . .49+%& ) , ) (&-4 and ) , 
respectively where F is the amount of the fine associated with having a second child. Note that F 
may assume a value of zero given the many exceptions to the One Child Policy (see Gu et al.: 
2007).  
                                                        
4 Given that a natural sex ratio of 105 boys for every 100 girls implies that the probability that a couple will have a 
son is slightly higher than the probability that they will have a daughter, the model assumes that when couples do 
not take any sex selective measures, they have a son with a probability of .51 and a daughter with a probability of .49. 
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 With these three expressions, we may solve for a couple’s optimal course of action using 
backward induction. Assuming that they conceive a second daughter, a couple faces the following 
set of payoffs at the third node: 
12345
6 $ %& ) (& ) , . '& 
1234
6 $ ), . '& . .51%&  
where 78 $ 1 indicates that the couple has selected for a son and 78 $ 0 indicates that the couple 
has left the sex of their second child to chance. Thus, a couple will choose to engage in sex-




 Ebenstein assumes that the probability with which a couple selects for the sex of their 
child to be 




where the probability of sex-selection increases as the difference between the utility associated 
with having a son and the cost of selecting for a son increases. When these two variables are 
equal, a couple is indifferent between selecting for a son and carrying a pregnancy to term. That 
is, the probability that a couple will select for a son is exactly one-half. 
 At the second decision node, a couple again faces two sets of payoffs:  
1A34
8 $ .51%& . .499;1
6: . '& 
1A34
8 $ '& 
Thus, the couple will choose to have a second child if . 51%& . .499;1
6:  0. This implies that 
couples with greater degrees of son preference are more likely to have second children within 
this framework.  
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 Finally, at the first decision node, couples choose between the following utility values for 
engaging in sex-selection in order to have a son (75 $ 1- and not doing so (75 $ 0-. 
12B4
5 $ .51%& . .499;1
8: 
12B45
5 $ %& ) (&  
For couples with son preference facing high fines, engaging in sex-selection at the first decision 
node is preferable to doing so at the third decision node. Thus, the fines associated with having 
second children exert a large influence over sex-ratio at birth among first children. 
 Ebenstein’s model also establishes that couples with relatively high degrees of son 
preference are more likely to have a second child, suggesting that sex-ratio at birth may be higher 
among second children (and therefore among children born to families with two or more 
children in general). Thus, the determinants of parents’ decisions regarding sex-selection may 
depend how many children they have already had. 
Together, these two models illustrate the forces that affect the fertility decisions of 
Chinese parents. Income, education, and access to the technology required for engaging in sex-
selection all play important roles in the decisions parents make about whether to realize their 
son preference through sex-selective behavior. This is especially true in developing countries 
where there is higher variation in the level of educational attainment and access to medical 
technology. Moreover, the policy framework in China has a direct effect on the choices that 
parents make about sex-selection. In the following section, my empirical analysis unearths some 
of the determinants of son preference in China, demonstrating that the One Child Policy has made 




V. Empirical Approach and Results 
 The dataset from the 2000 Chinese National Household Survey contains observations for 
1,180,111 individuals across all 31 provinces of China. Respondents answered a series of 72 
questions for the survey ranging from the number of people living in their home to the type of 
material used in the construction of their homes.  Since these responses are nearly all qualitative 
in nature, most of them can only be treated in empirical analysis as binary variables. In essence, 
empirical analysis on this particular data can, for the most part, only ask “yes or no” questions. 
 In order to isolate individuals relevant to my analysis of the effects of the One Child Policy, 
I have reduced this sample so that it only contains observations for married women who have 
had at least one child. Cutting the sample down in this way reduces the number of observations to 
245,677, that is, the number of married mothers in the sample. Finally, I reshape the data so that 
each child receives one entry in the sample. To do this, I have generated a new variable, chsex, 
which assumes a value of 1 if a child is female and a value of 0 if a child is male. Doing this 
replaces each single entry representing a mother with multiple entries corresponding to each of 
her children differentiated only by their sex. The variable for the sex of each child is the 
dependent variable utilized in the following set of regressions. 
 To test the effects of maternal educational attainment and other variables on the 
probability that a Chinese child will be female under the One Child Policy, I employ a differences-
of-differences approach to Chinese National Household Survey Data from 2000.  The 2000 
National Household Survey Data includes a large number of non-Chinese individuals living in 
China, who constitute an acceptable control group, since these individuals are unaffected by the 
One Child Policy. This allows me to differentiate between the effects of the introduction of 
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ultrasound in China during the 1980s and changes in fertility policy that occurred during the 
same period.  
In order to observe the effects of the One Child Policy, I have partitioned the sample into 
children of mothers (as of the year 2000) who married before 1975 and children whose mothers 
married after 1975. While the Chinese government did not officially enact the One Child Policy 
until 1981, partitioning the sample at 1975 leaves some cushioning between the year women 
were married and the year that they had children in an attempt to minimize the amount of “cross 
chatter” between the samples. Since there are nearly one hundred times as many women in the 
sample of women married after 1975 than in the sample of women married before 1975, the 
women married between 1975 and 1980 who had children during that period have a negligible 
effect on any results for the latter sample. For instance, 6384 Chinese marriages during the 
period from 1975-1980 (including 1975) resulted in the birth of a single child. This figure is 
nearly six times the number of Chinese mothers who had a single child and were married before 
1975, while it comprises only a little bit more than 6% of mothers married during or after 1975 
represented in the sample. Given that a number of the women married between 1975 and 1980 
had children after 1980, including these women in the much smaller sample of women who had 
children before the ratification of the One Child Policy has a much more deleterious effect on the 
reliability of any results. 
  I have chosen only to consider families with either one or two children. One especially 
prevalent variation of the One Child Policy, discussed in Ebenstein (2011) and above, allows 
Chinese couples to have a second child, provided that their first child is female. Other couples 
have second children in defiance of China’s national fertility policy and face large financial 
penalties. While looking at families with three or more children can certainly yield fruitful results 
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(Li, Yi, Zhang: 2010; Ebenstein, 2010), many births beyond two are the result of further 
exceptions to the One Child Policy (Gu, Wang, Guo, Zhang: 2007). The exceptions for families only 
having two children are more clear-cut, and analysis of families with one and two children has 
the potential to produce less ambiguous results. Unfortunately, in the case of families with two 
children, it is impossible to determine which couples have had a second child as a result of an 
exception to the One Child Policy and which families have had to pay a fine in order to do so. 
Therefore, these regressions cannot separate the effects of education, region, and income on 
these groups, although the effects of these variables may change considerably depending on the 
reason for a family’s increased fertility. 
Furthermore, while my dataset does not include information on the order in which 
children are born, the probability that a second child will be female conditional on his or her 
older sibling being male may be very different from the probability that a child will be female 
given that his or her older sibling is male. Thus, estimators for the two child case must be viewed 
as the aggregations of these two, presumably very different, probabilities. Nonetheless, given the 
increased levels of sex selection observed in families with multiple children, it is important to 
look at families with multiple children in addition to those with only one child. 
 My analysis considers families with one child and families with two children separately. 
Since different variables may play very different roles in the decisions of parents depending on 
the number of children they have, it makes sense to separate these two groups. This differs 
slightly from Ebenstein’s (2008) analysis, which considers first, second, and third-born children 
separately. Since my dataset contains no information about the order in which children were 
born, I separate the sample based on family size. Since adding families with three or more 
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children to my analysis will not add a great deal to the insights presented in this paper, I have 
elected to limit my focus to families with one or two children. 
 Each entry in the data represents one child. In keeping with the linear probability 
differences-of-differences framework, the dependent variable is a binary variable for the sex of 
each child. The variable assumes a value of one when the child is female and a value of zero when 
the child is male. Therefore, estimations may be interpreted as the probability that a child will be 
female given certain characteristics of his/her mother and the composition of his/her family. 
Since nearly all of the independent variables used in these regressions are also binary, it makes 
little sense to use Maximum Likelihood probability models such as Probit and Logit, since results 
from these regressions are much harder to interpret.  
 The probabilities estimated in the following regressions imply sex ratios at birth among 
different subsets of the Chinese population. Dividing the estimated probability by 100 and then 
subtracting 100 gives a figure for the expected number of boys per 100 girls born in a set of 
individuals with a given set of characteristics.  
 I make use of ten independent variables in my regression analyses. There are six dummy 
variables representing maternal educational attainment. These variables are denoted Primary 
School, Junior Middle, Senor Middle, Vocational, Junior College, and College in the regression tables 
on pages 35-38. A variable will assume a value of 1 if it corresponds to the highest level of 
education that a child’s mother has completed. These six categories are mutually exclusive, 
implying that, at most, only one of these variables will assume a value of 1. Furthermore, if all six 
of these variables take a value of zero, this indicates that an individual’s mother did not complete 
primary school and has had little or no education. 
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 Two dummy variables, City and Town, indicate whether an individual lives in an urban, 
town, or rural community. If both City and Town assume a value of zero, we may assume that an 
individual lives in a rural area, while City denotes an urban area and Town a less densely 
populated urban area.  
 Finally, I employ two discrete variables which are presumably highly correlated with 
income. While respondents to the 2000 National Household Survey do not give figures for their 
annual incomes, they indicate a range for either the price of their home or the cost of their 
monthly lease. I use the lower bound of each of these categories as a discrete variable that I 
substitute for household income in the regressions that follow. 
 The R-squared figures in each of the following regressions are quite low. While in some 
other context, this might indicate an extremely low amount of explanatory power in the 
regressions, it is important to note that these regressions do not directly explain the effects of 
education on sex-selection. While the probability that a child will be female is intimately related 
to the level of sex-selection among people similar to his or her mother, these two variables are 
still quite separate. Since the vast majority of Chinese couples choose to leave the sex of their 
child to chance, it is impossible to come close to explaining the determinants of a child’s sex based 
on characteristics of his or her mother.  
 For the purposes of this paper, I define any result that is different from zero at a 
significance level of 5% to be statistically significant. While this figure is, in some sense, arbitrary, 
it provides a reliable and frequently used benchmark for judging the significance of my 
estimators. 
 Table 1 displays regressions of the conditional probabilities that a child will be female 
within each of the four subsets of the Chinese population across families with one child and 
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families with two children. One immediately apparent result is the relative high rates of 
significance for the estimators of effects of education on the probability with which Chinese 
children whose mothers married after 1975 are female. The magnitudes of the estimators for the 
sample of children whose parents married after 1975 are also quite high relative to the other 
samples. While the coefficient on primary school does not appear to be significantly different 
from zero, the other coefficients increase in magnitude with the level of maternal educational 
attainment. With the exception of the coefficients for junior college and university, the estimators 
in this regression are all different from one another at a significance level of five percent.  
  There is also significant variation across levels of maternal educational attainment in the 
probabilities with which children in two-child Chinese families with parents married during or 
after 1975 are female. With the exception of the coefficient on the variable signifying that a child’s 
mother has attended university,5 the estimators follow a similar pattern to those in the one child 
case, increasing with the level of maternal educational attainment. The results of these two 
regressions indicate a positive correlation between maternal educational attainment and the 
probability that a child will be female in Chinese families with one child and two children.   
 While the first regression predicts that a single child born to a college-educated Chinese 
mother who married before 1975 will always be female, further investigation (in addition to 
common sense) dictates that this is preposterous. The sample only includes three such children, 
and all of them happen to be female. Therefore, it is safe to regard this estimator as unreliable. 
 Coefficients for Chinese children whose parents married before 1975 or non-Chinese 
families are much less consistently significant and much smaller. The sample of non-Chinese 
                                                        
5 Since there are only 104 children whose mother attended college in this sample, we can regard this estimator as 
somewhat unreliable. This fact is corroborated by the large standard error on the estimator. By contrast, the sample 
of single Chinese children contained nearly 2000 children whose mother had attended university. 
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families with one child married before 1975 is too small to yield any reliable estimations since it 
contains only 56 observations. That aside, no coefficient on any variable for non-Chinese families 
or Chinese families married before 1975 is significantly different from zero.6  
 The constant terms in each of the regressions on Chinese individuals indicate that mothers 
with no education have daughters at a rate far below what is biologically normal. Since the 
probability estimations in these regressions imply sex ratios at birth for children born to mothers 
in each of these subsets of the Chinese population, an estimated probability below .48 indicates 
significant levels of sex-selection. According to the estimators in Table 1, individuals who have 
not completed senior middle school or some higher level of educational attainment tend to have 
daughters at a rate significantly below the biologically normal level. Thus, I conclude that the 
majority of sex-selective behavior occurs in these subsets of the Chinese population. 
 Table 2 adds variables related to region to the regressions from Table 1. This appears to 
have a damping effect on the coefficients for maternal education among Chinese children whose 
mothers married during or after 1975. This is likely the result of multicollinearity within the 
explanatory variables. Women who live in more densely populated areas are more likely to have 
attended further years of school. For instance, approximately 46% of urban mothers with one 
child have attended at least senior middle school, while this figure falls to 7% among rural 
mothers with one child. Thus, using these two (nontrivially correlated) sets of variables can cause 
large changes in the values of the estimators when compared to regressions using either of the 
two sets of variables on its own. That said, the probability that a child will be female appears to 
be positively correlated with the population density of the area where he or she lives. This holds, 
to a lesser extent, for children whose mothers married before 1975 as well as children whose 
                                                        
6 Except for the coefficient for University in the very first regression, discussed above. 
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parents are not Chinese. Since ultrasound technology only began to see widespread use in China 
during the 1980s, the nearly universally significant coefficients on region-related variables for 
the pre-1975 subsample demand further explanation. It is highly unlikely that this variation is the 
result of biological factors, so under-reporting female births in rural areas and female infanticide 
may provide the most realistic explanation.  
 Table 3 includes variables for the value of the home in which children live or the monthly 
rental price on their home. Each of these variables is likely to be highly correlated with parental 
income. Furthermore, since income is undoubtedly positively correlated with educational 
attainment and the population density of the area in which a family lives, including income in 
these regressions also introduces some multicollinearity to the regressions, changing the values 
of the other estimators. However, doing so may ameliorate some omitted variable bias in the first 
regressions, allowing us to observe a truer estimation of the ceteris paribus effect of a higher level 
of maternal educational attainment.  
 In contrast to the regressions in Table 2, which contain variables relating to region, the 
inclusion of income-related variables in Table 3 has an amplifying effect on the estimators for 
educational attainment for children born to Chinese mothers married after 1975, again a result of 
multicollinearity Wealthier individuals are more likely to have completed additional years of 
schooling, and are also more likely to live in urban areas, implying correlation between the 
variables in the regressions.  Income-related variables are insignificant in every regression 
involving non-Chinese families or for Chinese families before 1975. Since fines for second and 
higher parity children were only introduced after the enactment of the One Child Policy, this 
likely reflects the costs imposed by the government on families who have two or more children. 
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In the case of families with one child, the significant negative value of the variable for home-price 
may also reflect the cost of taking sex-selective measures. 
 Table 4 consolidates the results of Tables 2 and 3, incorporating both regional and 
income-related variables. The estimators for the coefficients on education-related variables are 
lower than in Table 1, indicating that the damping effect of including regional variables 
dominates the amplifying effect observed in Table 3, which included income-related variables. 
Again, the difference in the significance and magnitude of estimators for Chinese families after 
1975 and estimators in all other regressions indicates that the One Child Policy effected a 
significant shift in the determinants of China’s sex ratio at birth. 
 Differences in the significance and magnitude of coefficients between mothers married 
before 1975 and Chinese mothers married after 1975 indicate that parents’ calculus with regards 
to the sex of their children underwent a significant shift starting in the 1980s. While, for mothers 
married before 1975, son preference appears to be dictated by regional differences, regardless of 
a mother’s nationality, the consistently positive correlation between maternal educational 
attainment and the probability that a child will be female (for Chinese mothers married after 
1975) stands in contrast to the scattershot set of estimators of the effects of maternal education 
for children born in non-Chinese families. Furthermore, comparing the magnitude of the 
coefficients for non-Chinese and Han individuals across these periods indicates that the One Child 
Policy had a significant effect on the determinants of the sex ratio at birth in China. Another 
intriguing change across these two periods is the significance of the coefficients on income-
related variables. In the context of Echavarri and Ezcurra’s (2010) assertion that, assuming the 
presence of the technology required for sex-selection, income becomes a vehicle of technological 
constraint change, this change may also be a result of the financial penalties associated with 
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additional births. The coefficients on income-related variables are only significant during the 
latter period, which is consistent with both the introduction of ultrasound in China and new 
financial penalties associated with having additional children.  
   Thus, in the context of Ebenstein’s (2008) model, it makes sense to conceive of the 
value (&  as a continuous variable, where (&  is the normalized cost to an individual of selecting for 
the sex of their child. This variable must be negatively correlated with income, since families with 
higher income will incur a lower relative cost when they select for the sex of their children. 
Furthermore, different families enjoy different levels of proximity to ultrasound technology, 
where “proximity” is defined to measure the normalized costs of selecting for a child’s sex that 
are not captured by income. This could include the price of sex-selective procedures in a given 
area or the convenience of simply going to a clinic to seek an abortion. 
 Furthermore, the increasing magnitude of the estimators of the effect of maternal 
educational attainment on the expected sex of a child suggest that the probability with which an 
individual mother will exhibit son preference is negatively correlated with her level of 
educational attainment. In the context of Ebenstein’s (2008) model, this suggests that son 
preference is negatively related to maternal education for individuals living under the One Child 
Policy. 
Chow tests on the estimators for the members of the control (non-Chinese) group also 
indicate significant differences in the estimators for children whose parents married before 1975 
and children whose parents married during or after 1975, indicating that there was also some 
change in the behavior of non-Chinese parents during the 1980s. However, simple observation 
reveals the relative magnitude of the changes in the behavior of Chinese parents was profoundly 
different and far more pronounced than changes in the behavior of non-Chinese parents. Indeed, 
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it makes sense that the introduction of ultrasound technology in China would have an influence 
on the sex-selective tendencies of parents whether or not they were subject to the One Child 
Policy, though perhaps not as visible an influence as it has had on parents living under its 
purview. This variation in the estimators for the non-Chinese group justifies the use of 
differences-of-differences in my empirical analysis, since it confirms that the One Child Policy was 
not the only factor in China’s rising sex ratio at birth. However, the magnitudes of the differences 
in estimators of the effects of education and income on the behavior of Chinese parents, 
especially when considered in contrast to the estimators of these effects for non-Chinese families, 
indicate that the One Child Policy had a significant effect on sex-selective behavior in China. 
VI. Sources of Error and Topics for Further Research 
 As identified by Goodkind (2011) any data on sex ratio at birth may be clouded by 
incentives to under-report children due to the One Child Policy. This may be especially true in the 
case of daughters, which would imply that there is some downward bias on my estimators due to 
sample selection error. One possible explanation for the variation in sex ratio at birth across 
segments of the population in the sample predating the One Child Policy is that parents who 
commit infanticide following the birth of a daughter simply deny ever having had their daughters 
to begin with. This may also cloud responses from more recent years, when the prospect of fines 
and other deterrents have created an environment where many parents hide their children from 
the eyes of the state. Increased enforcement of national fertility policy during the 1990s may have 
had an especially detrimental effect on the quality of data collected from families who had 
children during this period. 
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 Furthermore, lack of information on the availability of ultrasound technology across 
districts may introduce omitted variable bias to my regressions. Since the availability of sex-
selective technology may be highly correlated with many of the variables that I have included, 
especially those relating to region and income,. one way to expand upon the research presented 
in this paper would be to incorporate GIS data on the diffusion of ultrasound technology into an 
empirical analysis of the determinants of sex ratio at birth in China.  
 Without information on the magnitude and prevalence of fines, in addition to the lack of 
information on the availability of ultrasound, it is impossible to distinguish effects related to the 
“1.5 Child Policy” and those related to financial disincentives in families with multiple children. 
Incorporating this information would allow for the normalization of the cost of a second child 
across different regions, as in Ebenstein (2011). Furthermore, including information on various 
local exceptions to the One Child Policy (discussed in Part II) might further improve the quality of 
these results. 
 The lack of a continuous7 variable for education in China also leaves some doubt about the 
exact nature of the effects of education on son preference and sex-selection. Household survey 
data from 1982, 1990, and 2000 simply groups individuals into discrete categories of educational 
attainment. This may produce a more reliable set of responses, but having a variable for the 
number of years of education an individual has had could give a more precise idea of the effects of 
education on son preference. For instance, Echavarri and Ezcurra (2010) imply that there may be 
a nonlinear relationship between education and son preference. However, it is impossible to test 
for such a relationship without a (semi) continuous variable for education. Instead, based on the 
                                                        
7 On the natural numbers. 
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analysis presented in this paper, I may only state that there appears to be a negative correlation 
between maternal educational attainment and son preference. 
 Additionally, non-Chinese individuals may not be a perfect control group. It is possible 
that the various cultural values represented in these groups do not mirror those of Han 
individuals. Thus, in the absence of the One Child Policy, the introduction of ultrasound 
technology might not have had the same effect on these individuals as it would have had on Han 
Chinese individuals. A possible modification to this approach might be to consider the effects of 
the introduction of ultrasound technology on the fertility practices of Han Chinese individuals 
living in countries other than China such as Taiwan or Malaysia.  
 Finally, I have no way of measuring the impact that maternal education has on the voice 
that women have in the household. Fertility decisions may be made by both parents, or even 
solely by the male parent. Without a way to observe the process of fertility decision making in the 
context of each household, it is impossible to see the effect that educational attainment may have 
on female empowerment in marriage or in the community. This is a question that demands 
efforts of a more ethnographic variety, since statistics cannot easily capture the effects in 
question.  
VII. Conclusion 
 China’s imbalanced sex ratio at birth has swelled to perilously high levels since the 
enactment of the One Child Policy. While Chinese polities have attempted to alleviate this 
unintended consequence of China’s national fertility policies, the gap in the number of boys 
and girls born in China continues to grow. In the coming decade, there are expected to be 
more than 30 million excess males in China’s adult population as a result of a consistently 
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unbalanced birth population. While the social consequences of this development remain 
largely unrealized, predictions of their nature and magnitude are less than optimistic (den 
Boer, Hudson: 2004). Furthermore, any attempt to fully reverse thirty-four years of damage 
will undoubtedly require many more years of highly concentrated efforts. As of now, China 
must deal with its glut of males while making more deliberate efforts to curb their growing 
numbers. 
 At the close of “More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing,” a seminal text in the 
study of the worldwide deficit of women, Amartya Sen issues this call to action: 
 
A great many more than 100 million women are simply not there because 
women are neglected compared with men. If this situation is to be corrected by 
political action and public policy, the reasons why there are so many ‘missing’ 
women must first be better understood. We confront here what is clearly one of 
the more momentous, and neglected, problems facing the world today. (1990) 
 
Today, China is the most egregious contributor to the global surplus of men. With even larger 
numbers of newborn males relative to females in China, efforts to combat its widening gender 
gap have largely failed. However, in order to mobilize more effective policy responses to 
China’s demographic woes, it is essential that scholars continue to investigate the 
determinants of son preference in China. 
This paper has drawn on models of sex-selection in China and India to inform its focus. 
Little scholarship has focused on the link between education and son preference, though work 
by Echavarri and Ezcurra (2010) implies that son preference is negatively correlated with 
education, while the propensity of individuals to engage in sex-selective behavior is positively 
correlated with income, itself a positive function of educational attainment. Ebenstein (2008) 
demonstrates that, in the context of the One Child Policy, parents decide whether to engage in 
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sex-selection based on the excess utility they associate with having a male child, as well as the 
costs they will incur if they elect to engage in sex-selection.  
While son preference is exogenously determined in Ebenstein’s (2008) model, I 
propose that, in the context of the One Child Policy, the relative amount of utility an individual 
associates with having a son as opposed to having a daughter is a negative function of their 
educational attainment. The empirical results presented in Section V support this claim, 
demonstrating a consistently positive relationship between maternal educational attainment 
and the probability that a child will be female in the cases of families with one and two 
children. In fact, women who have reached the highest levels of educational attainment tend 
to have children around the biologically normal level, while women who have not reached 
high levels of educational attainment produce male children at rates well below it. 
This result implies that greater investment in women’s education may, in the long run, 
promote a more balanced birth population with respect to gender. However, given the lag 
time that such a measure would require to take effect, it can only be regarded as a secondary 
tool in the set of policy measures that the Chinese government may employ in this dire 
situation. Shorter-term measures could include subsidies for families with female children to 
try to lower the relative utility that parents associate with having sons. Additionally, the 
government has already enacted laws to prevent doctors from divulging to parents the sex of 
their unborn children, though sex-selection clearly remains a problem in spite of this change.  
Recent relaxations of the One Child Policy may also have some positive effect on the 
sex ratio at birth. The Chinese government now allows couples consisting of two individuals 
with no siblings to have two children instead of just one. While this amendment to the One 
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Child Policy may diminish its negative effects in some small way, there is still little reason to 
believe that it will make any significant dent in the glut of male newborns in China. 
The negative correlation between maternal education and son preference implied by 
the results of my empirical analysis indicates that China’s surplus of male babies is a holdover 
from traditional society. China’s rapid and uneven development has left areas of the country’s 
consciousness still rooted in the patriarchal values that dictated nearly every aspect of daily 
life in China for millennia. While there is no surefire way to rebalance China’s sex 
composition, it is likely that further advancements along the developmental ladder will help 
















Definition of Variables: 
Primary School: Assumes a value of 1 if an individual’s highest level of educational attainment 
is either primary school or an adult literacy course. I have chosen to group these two 
categories together since very few individuals have received the latter course of education 
and because these two types of education instill very similar sets of knowledge in individuals. 
Junior Middle: Assumes a value of 1 if an individual’s highest level of educational attainment is 
the completion of junior middle school. In China, a large plurality of individuals do not attend 
school beyond this point, with senior middle schooling often serving as a course of study in 
preparation for application to a junior college or university. 
Senior Middle: Assumes a value of 1 if an individual’s highest level of educational attainment is 
the completion of senior middle school, which is analogous to high school in America. 
Vocational: Assumes a value of 1 if an individual’s highest level of educational attainment is 
the completion of vocational training. Some individuals who have attended vocational school 
may also have attended senior middle school, while some may not have done so. 
Junior College: Assumes a value of 1 if an individual has completed a degree at a junior college, 
equivalent to a two-year associate’s degree. 
College: Assumes a value of 1 if an individual has completed college or university. 
City: Assumes a value of 1 if an individual lives in an urban area. 
Town: Assumes a value of 1 if an individual lives in a suburban area. 
Home Price: Data on home prices in the 2000 National Household Survey groups individuals 
into discrete categories based on the price of their home. This variable is coded as the lower 
bound of the category identified in the Survey. 
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Monthly Lease: Data on lease prices in the 2000 National Household survey also groups 
individuals into discrete categories based on the rental price they pay for their home each 
month. I have also coded this variable as the lower bound on the category identified on the 
Survey. Note that Home Price and Monthly Lease are mutually exclusive variables, meaning 
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